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Abstract
High commodity prices have increased interest in the impacts of federal ethanol
policies. We present a stochastic, short-run structural model of U.S. corn, ethanol, and
gasoline markets to estimate the price and welfare impacts of alternative policies on
producers and consumers of corn, ethanol, and gasoline. The three federal policies that
we consider are the Renewable Fuels Standard, the blenders tax credit, and the tariff on
imported ethanol. Our model examines the impact of these policies on prices during the
2008/09 marketing year. Our results show that in the short run, a change in U.S. ethanol
policies would not have a large, immediate impact on corn prices. Eliminating any one of
the policies would reduce average corn prices by less than 4%. Removal of all three
programs would decrease average corn prices by 14.5%. The reason why the changes are
relatively modest is that existing U.S. ethanol plants will only shut down if their variable
cost of production is not covered. Changes in ethanol policies would have large
distributional impacts. Corn growers, ethanol producers, and fuel consumers have a large
incentive to maintain high ethanol consumption. Gasoline producers have a large
incentive to reduce ethanol production and imports. Livestock producers have a large
short-run incentive to reduce domestic ethanol production.
Keywords: ethanol policy, stochastic equilibrium model, welfare analysis.
1 Introduction
The role that U.S. biofuel policies play in determining food prices is a subject of key interest.
For example, Governor Rick Perry of Texas has requested a 50% reduction in the mandated
use of ethanol because "this misguided mandate is signicantly a¤ecting Texansfamily food
bill."1 It is understandable why many place the blame for the sharp runup in agricultural
commodity prices on U.S. corn ethanol policies. If 25% of U.S. corn is used to create ethanol,
then elimination of ethanol could cause corn prices to drop in half. However, this simple
calculation provides little insight into the impact that a change in U.S. ethanol policies have
on the price of corn, food, and gasoline because U.S. ethanol plants will not simply disappear
with a change in U.S. ethanol policies. Plants will keep operating as long as they make more
money operating (or lose less) than they would make by shutting down.
The purpose of the paper is to examine the short term impacts of a change in ethanol
policies. By short-term we mean the following: What impact would a change in federal
policies have on the supply of ethanol and the market price of corn and fuel during the
period September 1, 2008 to August 31, 2009? This period corresponds to the marketing
year for the 2008 corn and soybean crops. We also estimate the magnitude of the transfers
and the associated welfare changes from alternative policies. A focus on corn is warranted
because it is the crop most directly a¤ected by U.S. biofuel policies, and it is the crop that
most determines the impacts on the cost of food because of its importance in determining
the cost of feeding livestock.
The three federal policies we consider are the Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS), the
blenders tax credit, and the tari¤ on imported ethanol. The blenders tax credit is a direct
subsidy given to gasoline blenders. The credit increases the willingness of blenders to buy
ethanol. This increased demand increases the price of ethanol, ethanol prots, and produc-
tion, the demand for corn, and the price of corn. The tax credit has greatly stimulated the
growth of the industry. The import tari¤ is a tax on imported ethanol. It has prevented
1April 25, 2008, press release from Governor Perry.
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the United States. from importing large quantities of ethanol from Brazil except for a short
time during 2006 when the phase-out of MTBE caused U.S. ethanol prices to skyrocket. The
RFS species minimum biofuel consumption levels for the United States. Mandated use rises
from 9 billion gallons in 2008 to 10.5 billion gallons in 2009. These mandates can be met
from either domestically produced or imported biofuels.
We develop a multi-market, stochastic equilibrium model to simultaneously simulate the
price and price volatility of the U.S. corn, ethanol, and fuel for the 2008/09 marketing year.
The simulation model is a stochastic version of short-run structural demand and supply
models of corn, ethanol, and gasoline markets in the United States. The factors that we
treat as stochastic when the model was run (the end of May 2008) are planted acreage,
acres not harvested for grain, corn yield, the price of crude oil, export demand, and the
capacity of the ethanol industry. Our model attempts to decipher the primary causes of
uncertainty in the U.S. corn market in the midst of increasing demand for corn as an energy
substitute and new legislation. Our structural model allows us to study the short-run impact
of a change in federal biofuel policies, and also easily allows us to analyze the impacts of
new information on the price distribution of commodities. McPhail and Babcock (March
2008) simulated the price distribution of corn with information available in early March
2008. The current model run includes updated information released since then, including
the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) March "Prospective Plantings" report and the
May 2008 World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimate (WASDE) report. In addition,
the model incorporates higher crude oil prices than in March. The present study is the rst
one to examine the impact of the Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) mandate
on the price variability of corn.
The next section of the paper reviews the previous work. The third section presents the
structural model and assumptions used in the present study. The fourth section reports
the results of the simulation under di¤erent scenarios. The fth and nal section presents
conclusions.
3
2 Previous Work
The existing literature does not report use of a short-run structural model to understand the
link between ethanol, energy, and corn. A limited number of studies use long-run structural
models to understand the impacts of biofuels. Elobeid et al. (2007) provide the rst com-
prehensive look at the impacts of ethanol on agriculture and the bioeconomy. Later Tokgoz
et al. (2007) expand the work of Elobeid et al. (2007) by including work on the equilibrium
prices of co-products of the biofuel industries, most importantly distillers grains. Baker et al.
(2008) develop a stochastic and dynamic general equilibrium model that captures the uncer-
tain nature of key variables such as crude oil prices and commodity yields and incorporates
acreage limitations on key feedstocks.
Few existing studies examine the welfare impacts from a change in current U.S. ethanol
policies. Most of the studies focus on the welfare impact of one or two of the policies.
Several studies (Gardner 2007, de Gorter and Just 2007a, Schmitz et al. 2007) compare the
e¢ ciency of using ethanol subsidies to the e¢ ciency of payment programs for corn farmers.
Martinez-Gonzalez et al. (2007) calculate the distortions on U.S. imports from Brazil alone
while Kruse et al. (2007) analyze the simultaneous removal of the tax credit and tari¤ (the
mandate is assumed not to be binding). Elobeid and Togkoz (2007) model the elimination
of the tari¤ alone and then the elimination of the tari¤ and tax credit simultaneously (the
possibility of a mandate is not mentioned). de Gorter and Just (2007c) provide a framework
to analyze the impact of an ethanol import tari¤ in conjunction with a consumption mandate
and tax credit. Our study enhances the welfare literature by capturing the stochastic nature
and providing a distribution of welfare impacts.
The agricultural economics literature contains studies of the impact of government policy
on commodity price volatility. Lence and Hayes (2002) used a dynamic three-commodity,
rational-expectation model to compare the impact of the Federal Agricultural Improvement
and Reform (FAIR) Act of 1996 with a free-market policy, and with the agricultural policies
that preceded the FAIR Act, and found that the changes enacted by FAIR did not lead
4
to permanent signicant increases in the volatility of farm prices or revenues. The mixed
ndings of Zulauf and Blue (2003) point to continuing disagreement about governments role
in managing farm risk in the post-1996 farm bill world. Isengildina-Massa et al. (2008) used
an event study to investigate the impact of USDA WASDE reports on implied volatility in
corn and soybean markets over the period 1985-2002 and found thatWASDE reports lead to a
statistically signicant reduction of implied volatility for corn and soybeans. The magnitude
of the reduction is largest for the group of WASDE reports containing both domestic and
international situation and outlook information. They also found that the market impact of
WASDE reports is strongest in the most recent 1996-2002 sub-period. The stochastic model
presented in the next section allows us to examine the impact of the EISA mandate on the
price volatility of corn.
3 Model Structure and Assumptions
A stochastic equilibrium model is developed to study the impact of the mandate, the tax
credit to ethanol blenders, and the ethanol import tari¤ on the price of corn and the price
of fuel. The model solves for equilibrium corn prices, ethanol prices, and gasoline prices
in the 2008/09 marketing year. The model is stochastic in the sense that the equilibrium
prices depend on the realizations of six random variables. Expectations about price levels
and estimates of the price volatility of corn, ethanol, and gasoline can be obtained by solving
the model for multiple draws of the random variables and then taking averages and standard
deviations of variables across all draws. We assume that random draws are obtained given
information available at the end of May 2008. Thus, planted acres, acres not harvested
for grain, and yield are all uncertain, which implies that the supply of corn is stochastic.
Corn demand is stochastic as well. We consider three random variables that cause demand
uncertainty: the position of the export demand curve, crude oil prices, and the capacity of
the U.S. corn ethanol industry. Because we do not account for all sources of uncertainty that
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a¤ect corn prices, our estimated price volatilities should be lower than implied volatilities
observed in the market.2
3.1 Stochastic Corn Supply in the 2008/09 Marketing Year
Corn supply in the 2008/09 marketing year is determined by planted acreage, the di¤erence
between actual planted acreage and acreage harvested for grain, and the yield per harvested
acre. Uncertainty in supply comes from uncertain planted acreage, uncertain non-harvested
acres, and uncertain yield. Corn prices in 2008 will be a¤ected by harvested acreage and
yield in particular because stock levels are relative to use. According to the May WASDE
report, U.S. ending stocks for 2008/09 are projected to be 763 million bushels. The demand
for corn is strong because of the rapidly expanding consumption of corn used for ethanol
production and the strong outlook of export demand due to the low value of the U.S. dollar.
Corn supply in 2008 is given by
QSc;t = ( eAc;t   edc;t)  eyc;t (1)
where QSc;t denotes the supply of corn, eAc;t is realized planted acreage of corn at time t; edc;t
is the di¤erence between actual planted acreage and acreage harvested for grain, ( eAc;t  edc;t)
is the harvested acreage of corn at time t, and yc;t is yield per harvested acre We decompose
corn supply in this manner because planted acreage is projected by the USDA, but harvested
acreage determines actual supply.
Historical yields from 1957 to 2007 are used to estimate the probability distribution of
the yield per harvested acre of the 2008 corn crop. We assume that the mean yield of corn
per harvested acre follows a linear trend and estimate the percentage deviation in actual
corn yields from trend yields from 1957 to 2007.3 The average percent deviation multiplied
2In addition, our estimated price volatilities do not account for the proportion of implied volatilities that
generate returns to options traders.
3More sophisticated trend models were t to the yield model, but the 2008 projected trend yield and the
estimated percent deviations from trend over the time series di¤ered little from those obtained from a simple
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by the 2008 trend yield is used as the standard deviation of national yield. Yield data
were obtained from National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS). The 2008 corn yield is
assumed to follow a beta distribution:
eyc;2008  beta(yc;2008; 2yc ; py; qy) (2)
where yc;2008 = 151, 
2
yc = 194;max eyc;2008 = 177;min eyc;2008 = 113; py = 2:43; and qy =
1:66:Figure 1 shows the resulting distribution.
Yield is independent of planted acreage. A forward-looking, rational farmer decides
to plant corn, soybeans, wheat, or other crops to maximize expected prots based on the
information set he has about expected prices, yields, and costs of di¤erent crops. The
farmers expected prot maximization provides us with information about expected acreage
of corn but does not provide information about uncertainty of planted acreage. On March 31,
USDA released the "Prospective Plantings" report for 2008. According to the report, corn
growers intend to plant 86.0 million acres of corn for all purposes in 2008. We look at the
error between the USDAs annual report on prospective planted acreages that are released in
March and the actual planted corn acreage to obtain a distribution of corn acreage subject
to the March report. The standard deviation of these historical di¤erences is 1.658 million
acres. Thus we assume the planted acreage in 2008 (in million acres) follows a normal
distribution:
eAc;2008  N(86; 1:658) (3)
The newly released "Prospective Plantings" report not only shows the intentions of farmers
but also projects the market price, which may inuence the actual planted acreage. We
assume that the uncertainty of the distribution based on historical data is able to capture
any market response after the release of the report.
linear trend.
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The di¤erence between planted acreage and acreage harvested for grain (non-harvested
acres) is a function of planted acres, a time trend and the percent deviation in actual corn
yields from trend yields: Low national yields means that farmers will choose not to harvest
some acres; thus, we expect a negative relationship between non-harvested acres and the
deviation in actual yield from predicted yield. NASS data from 1957 to 2007 were used to
estimate the relationship The regression equation for non-harvested acres edc;t (in million
acres) is as follows:
edc;t = b0 + b1  eAc;t + b2  t+ b3  ydc;t (4)
where ydc;t = (eyc;t   yc;t)=yc;t is the percent deviation in actual corn yields from trend yields.
Table 1 reports the OLS regression results. The standard deviation of the predicted error
term is 1.093. We introduce a standard normal error to 2008 U.S. non-harvested acres for
corn (in million acres). Thus,
edc;2008 = b0 + b1  eAc;2008 + b2  t+ b3  ydc;2008 + e"c;2008 (5)
where e"c;2008  N(0; 1:093):
3.2 Corn Demand in the 2008 Marketing Year
Corn demand has ve components: food, feed, storage, exports, and the demand from the
ethanol industry.
3.2.1 Feed, food, and storage demand
Food, feed, and storage demand are assumed to be nonstochastic. This simplifying as-
sumption will reduce estimated price volatility. The demand curves depend on the average
price received by farmers in the 2008/09 marketing year: QD;feedc;t = g
feed(Pc;t);Q
D;food
c;t =
gfood(Pc;t);Q
D;storage
c;t = g
storage(Pc;t) where Q
D;feed
c;t is domestic feed demand of corn at time
8
t, QD;foodc;t is domestic food demand of corn at time t, and Q
D;storage
c;t is the demand of corn
from storage; QD;feedc;t , Q
D;food
c;t ; and Q
D;storage
c;t are linear functions of Pc;t, the price of corn at
time t: Parameters for these demand curves are obtained by assuming a demand elasticity
and calibrating to the latest USDA projections in the WASDE on May 9, 2008.4 The feed
demand elasticity is xed at -0.25. The food demand elasticity is xed at -0.096. Thus, the
feed and food demand curves (in million bushels) in the 2008/09 marketing year are
QD;feedc;2008 = 6625  240:9  Pc;2008 (6)
QD;foodc;2008 = 1490:6  23:7  Pc;2008 (7)
Storage demand elasticity is set equal to -0.65 (FAPRI). WASDE projects that the ending
stock for the 2008/09 marketing year is 763 million bushels. We believe that the storage
demand cannot be much lower than this amount. Thus the storage demand curve is as
follows:
QD;storagec;2008 = max(763; 1259  90:2  Pc;2008) (8)
3.2.2 Stochastic export demand
We assume that the export demand uncertainty is mainly due to the uncertainty of the value
of the dollar relative to the currencies of the major corn exporting and importing countries
and the uncertainty of feed grain production in other countries. Over 2007, the value of the
dollar fell against many currencies. A falling dollar makes corn exports look more attractive
to importers and therefore increases export demand.
The reduced demand function of corn from export is a function of the cash price
QD;exportc;t = g
export(Pc;t; "
D;export
c;t ) (9)
4http://www.usda.gov/oce/commodity/wasde
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where QD;exportc;t is the export demand of corn; which is a function of Pc;t and "
D;export
c;t , a
realization of export demand shock: We introduce the export demand shock through the
intercept of the demand curve. For simplicity, we use the uncertainty of the dollar to capture
the uncertainty of export demand. The average implied volatility for the U.S. dollar index
(USDX) option on the New York Board of Trade on March 19, 2008, was approximately
10%.5 We assume that the short-term export demand elasticity is -0.6 and calibrate the
export demand curve based on WASDE. Thus, the export demand curve of corn (in million
bushels) in the 2008/09 marketing year is
QD;exportc;2008 = 3360  (1 + 10%  "D;exportc;2008 )  229  Pc;2008 (10)
where "D;exportc;2008  N(0; 1):
3.2.3 Stochastic demand of corn from ethanol
The demand of corn from the ethanol industry is determined by ethanol production capacity,
the percentage of capacity that is in operation, and the number of bushels of corn required
to produce a gallon of ethanol:
QD;ec;t = eEt  t  t (11)
where QD;ec;t is the demand of corn from ethanol; t is the percentage of the ethanol capacity
with a nonnegative operating margin; eEt is the capacity of ethanol production; and t is the
number of bushels of corn required to produce a gallon of ethanol:
First, we estimate the distribution of ethanol production capacity, eEt: Keeping track
of industry capacity has been a challenge given the explosive growth. Ethanol industry
capacity numbers are reported by at least two entities. The lists of plants are given by
the Renewable Fuels Association and the American Coalition for Ethanol. These sources
suggest that industry capacity at the end of 2007 was around 7 billion gallons. Continued
5The USDX is an average of six major world exchange rates and a comprehensive indicator of the dollars
value.
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strong growth in capacity coming online is expected in the rst half of the 2008/09 marketing
year. The rate of new capacity coming online is expected to slow in the second half of the
marketing year. Based on information from these resources, we assume that the maximum
capacity in the 2008/09 marketing year is 13.5 billion gallons, the minimum capacity is 9
billion gallons, and the average capacity is 11.5 billion gallons. A beta distribution is again
used to capture uncertainty (Figure 2):6
eE2008  beta(E; 2E; pE;qE) (12)
where Et+1 = 11:5; 2E = 0:5;min eEt+1 = 9;max eEt+1 = 13:5; pE = 5; qE = 4:
The second demand component is t: Negative processing margins will cause ethanol
plants to shut down. Because all plants pay the same price for corn, those plants that
produce the least ethanol per bushel of corn processed will tend to shut down rst. We
denote gallons of ethanol produced per bushel of corn as : The distribution of  determines
the proportion of existing capacity that will operate given input and output prices. With a
mean of 2.75 gallons per bushel, we assume a maximum e¢ ciency of 2.9 gallons per bushel
and a minimum e¢ ciency of 2.5 gallons per bushel. There are no reliable data on which to
base plant heterogeneity; thus, we make a reasonable approximation by xing the variance
equal to 0.005. Using a beta distribution again, we specify the distribution of  as follows:
e  beta(; 2; p; q) (13)
where  = 2:75; 
2
 = 0:005;  = 2:5;  = 2:9, p = 4:0625; and q = 2:4375: See Figure 3
for a graph of this distribution.
The operating margin per bushel of corn processed for a dry mill ethanol plant is
6Capacity for 2008 in the ethanol industry was largely determined before EISA came into force; thus,
we assume that the ethanol capacity distribution is exogeneous to the EISA mandate. We also assume that
ethanol production capacity is independent of corn and ethanol prices. We dont consider the possibility
of stopping before completion of the current expansion when the prot margin cannot cover the annualized
xed cost. The capacity distribution could capture the plants di¢ culty getting enough credit from banks
because of the current bank crisis.
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E;t = [  Pe;t +Dt  Pdistillers;t]  (Pc;t +  OPCt) (14)
where E;t is the operating prot margin per bushel, Dt is tons of coproduct distillers grains
per bushel, Pe;t is the ethanol price per gallon, Pdistillers;t is the distillers grains price per ton
(1 ton equals 2,000 pounds), OPCt is the operating cost per gallon, [  Pe;t +Dt  Pdistillers;t]
is the revenue per bushel of corn, and Pc;t+  OPCt is the variable cost per bushel of corn.
According to F.O. Lichts (2006), the operating cost for an ethanol plant OPCt is $0.54 per
gallon. One bushel of corn processed returns 17 pounds of distiller grains; thus, Dt = 172000 :
We take the value of the distillers grains as a function of the price of corn. Following
Babcock (2008), the relationship between the per ton value of distillers grain and the per
bushel price of corn is
Pdistillers;t = 52:5 + 16:406  Pc;t (15)
For any ethanol plant, the operating prot margin function can be written
E;t =   (Pe;t   0:54)  0:860 55Pc;t + 0:446 25 (16)
For each realization of ethanol price Pe;t and corn price Pc;t, we can calculate the threshold
e¢ ciency index b with zero prot:
E;t j=b= 0 (17)
Thus, ethanol plants with a production e¢ ciency index above b make positive operating
prot. Ethanol plants with a production e¢ ciency index below b shut down in the short
run. Therefore,
t( ePc;t; ePe;t; e) = Pr(  b) (18)
where t is the percentage of the ethanol capacity with a nonnegative operating margin.
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The third demand component is t7, which is the average bushels of corn required to
produce a gallon of ethanol for the operating ethanol plants.
t =
1
E( j   b) (19)
Therefore, the demand of corn from ethanol for the 2008/09 marketing year QD;ec;2008 is
QD;ec;2008 = eE2008  2008( ePc;2008; ePe;2008; e)  2008 (20)
3.3 Stochastic Ethanol Supply
Ethanol supply is comprised of two parts: the domestic supply and the import supply.
3.3.1 Stochastic ethanol domestic supply
The analysis above also gives us the stochastic domestic supply of ethanol for the 2008/09
marketing year as follows:
QDSe;t =
eEt  t( ePc;t; ePe;t; e) (21)
where QDSe;t is the domestic ethanol supply, which is a function of the percentage of ethanol
plants with a nonnegative operating margin t and capacity of ethanol production eEt:
3.3.2 Nonstochastic ethanol import supply
We assume that the ethanol import supply is determined primarily by U.S. trade policy on
ethanol, the price di¤erence between U.S. ethanol and world ethanol, transportation cost,
and the size of the ethanol sector in other countries (primarily Brazil). U.S. trade policy
on ethanol includes an ad valorem tari¤ of 2.5 % as well as an import duty of $0.54 per
gallon. One motivation for this tari¤ is to ensure that the benets of the current domestic
7For our simulation, we set t = 1=2:75 for simplicity.
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U.S. ethanol tax credit of $0.51-per-gallon do not accrue to foreign producers, although
this rationale has been weakened by the recent reduction in the tax credit, which was not
accompanied by an equivalent reduction in the tari¤. The Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI)
is the other important trade policy for ethanol, under which duty-free status is granted to
ethanol from the beneciary countries8 under certain conditions. If ethanol is produced
from at least 50% local feedstock (e.g., sugarcane grown in CBI beneciary countries), it
is admitted into the U.S. free of duty. If the local feedstock content is lower, limitations
apply on the quantity of duty-free ethanol. Nevertheless, up to 7% of the U.S. market may
be supplied duty-free by CBI ethanol containing no local feedstock. To comply with this
requirement, hydrous (wet) ethanol produced from non-CBI countries can be imported to a
CBI country for dehydration and then be exported to the U.S. after it is rehydrated in a CBI
country. The di¤erence between U.S. and world ethanol prices is an important indicator of
the competitiveness of U.S. versus others countriesethanol sectors. For example, if we see
a large increase in the price di¤erence between U.S. and world ethanol, we could expect an
increase in ethanol imported from Brazil. However, the renewable fuel mandate in Brazil
reduces the elasticity of ethanol supply from Brazil. There are no reliable data on which
to estimate the supply of imports from Brazil. We assume that the ethanol import supply
will be 1.6 billion gallons if exporters make 40 cents per gallon more in the U.S. than they
would in Brazil after paying transportation costs and any tari¤. We also assume that the
ethanol import supply will be 800 million gallons if exporters make the same in the U.S. as
they do in Brazil after transportation and tari¤ costs. Based on these beliefs, we can only
make reasonable approximations of the linear import supply (in billion gallons) as follows:
QISe;t = max(0; 0:8 + 2  ( ePe;t   ePBre   TCe   tm)) (22)
8The beneciary countries are those named under the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA),
which include Central American countries and Caribbean countries.
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where QISe;t is the ethanol import supply, ePBre is the ethanol price in Brazil, TCe is the cost of
transporting a gallon of ethanol from Brazil to the U.S. and tm is the import duty and tari¤.
We do not intend to model the Brazil ethanol market; thus, we assume that ePBre = 0:66 ePg;t for
approximation, where ePg;t is the gasoline price in the U.S.. We also assume that TCe = $0:18
per gallon and tm = $0:6 per gallon.9 Thus, QISe;t = max(0; 0:8+2( ePe;t 0:66 ePg;t 0:18 tm)):
Thus, the total supply of ethanol for the 2008/09 marketing year is
QSe;t = Q
DS
e;t +Q
IS
e;t (23)
where QSe;t is the total supply of ethanol.
3.4 Stochastic Ethanol Demand
We calibrated the rst segment of the demand for ethanol (1d) based on the following
assumptions. We believe that ethanol demand is very inelastic up to 4 billion gallons, because
ethanols use is mandated for some regions of the country that must meet clean air standards
and because ethanol is the best source of octane in gasoline blends. We assume the demand
for ethanol will be more than 4 billion gallons as long as the price of ethanol relative to
that of gasoline is less than 1:1. In this segment of the demand curve, the demand elasticity
is -0.06 following FAPRI. We calibrated the second segment of the ethanol demand curve
(2d) to the price and demand data for the 2007/08 marketing year. Fuel blenders say that
they use one gallon of ethanol to replace one gallon of gasoline and will continue to do this
up to about 14 billion gallons, but we know that transportation bottlenecks create a lower
willingness to pay for ethanol below its intrinsic value in a fuel blend. Although we might
expect to see ethanol selling above its energy value for aggregate ethanol volumes in the range
of 10 to 14 billion gallons per year, transportation bottlenecks that need to be overcome in
delivering ethanol to population centers have tended to reduce prices. Eventually, ethanol
9According to U.S. trade policy, tm = 2:5%  ePe;t + 0:54: Thus, QISe;t = 800 + 2000  ( ePe;t   0:66 ePg;t  
0:18  2:5%  ePe;t   0:54) = 800 + 2000  ((1  tm%) ePe;t   0:66 ePg;t   0:18  tm$).
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will be valued by its energy value. Because ethanol has approximately 67.8% of the energy
content of gasoline, the conventional wisdom is that blendersmaximum willingness to pay
for ethanol as a substitute fuel source is 67.8% of the price of gasoline, as consumers will
not pay more than this amount because of lower mileage performance in their automobiles.
Thus, it seems likely that owners of ex-fuel vehicles in the U.S. will not use E-85 unless
it is priced to reect its lower energy content. But if there are adequate numbers of E-85
vehicles or if the United States moves to allow ethanol blends in excess of E-10, then all
gasoline consumers will have an incentive to use ethanol blends if the price of the blend is
low enough. This suggests a quite elastic demand for ethanol as a substitute for gasoline at
increased quantities of ethanol. We assume that the third segment of the ethanol demand
curve (3d) is perfectly elastic given the gasoline price. Therefore the demand curves of
ethanol (in billion gallons) in the 2008/09 marketing year are
(1d) QDe;t = 4:22  0:2  (
ePe;t   tceePg;t ) 8QDe;t < 4 &
ePe;t   tceePg;t > 1:1 (24)
(2d) QDe;t = 13:625  8:75  (
ePe;t   tceePg;t ) (25)
8QDe;t 2 [4; 7:7) &
ePe;t   tceePg;t 2 (0:6781; 1:1]
(3d) QDe;t = Q
S
Ethanol;t &
ePethanol;t   tceePgas;t = 0:67818QDEthanol;t  7:7 (26)
where QDe;t is the demand of ethanol, tce is the tax credit to the ethanol blenders,
10 and QDg;t
is the demand of gasoline.
10The blenders tax credit does not go down to 45 cents until Jan. 1, 2009. So there are four months at 51
cents and 8 months at 45 cents. Thus we use a 47 cents blenders tax credit in our simulation.
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3.5 Stochastic Fuel Demand
The demand for transportation fuel (gasoline blended with ethanol) depends on the weighted
price of fuel: QDf;t = f( ePf;t), where ePf;t =   ePe;t + (1  )  ePg;t, QDf;t = 0:6781 QDe;t +QDg;t
and  =
Qe;t
Qe;t+Qg;t
. Ethanol as a substitute for gasoline will reduce the demand for gasoline.
However, a lower ethanol price will reduce the blended fuel price, thus increasing the demand
for fuel and the demand for gasoline. So the net e¤ect of ethanol on the demand and the
price of gasoline depends on both the substitution e¤ect and the income e¤ect. The blended
fuel demand curve can be calibrated to the demand and price data of gasoline and ethanol of
the Energy Information Administrations (EIA) short-term energy and summer fuel outlook
in the 2007/08 marketing year. In this outlook the average rener price of gasoline for resale
(CBOB) for the 2007/08 marketing year is $2.62 per gallon. The average rack price for
ethanol for the 2007/08 marketing year is $2.36 per gallon. The demand for motor gasoline
for the 2007/08 marketing year is 142.7 billion gallons (including the demand for ethanol).
The demand for ethanol for the 2007/2008 marketing year is 7.4 billion gallons. Adjusting for
the energy value of ethanol, the demand is 139.6 billion gallons. We use the price of gasoline
from the EIA short-term energy and summer fuel outlook and the price of ethanol from the
futures market to calculate a weighted average price of composite fuel of $2:6 per gallon. We
assume that the short-run price elasticity of gasoline demand is -0.1. We introduce a 1.5%
annual increase of fuel consumption. Thus, the fuel demand curve (in billion gallons) for the
2008/09 marketing year is
QDf;t = 155:86  5:45  ePf;t (27)
The gasoline demand (in billion gallons) for the 2008/09 marketing year is
QDg;t = Q
D
f;t   0:6781 QDe;t
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3.6 Stochastic Gasoline Supply
3.6.1 Domestic gasoline supply
In the long run, the growth in biofuels a¤ects both the mix and volume of new renery
capacity that is needed. However, in the short run the U.S. renery capacity is xed. Thus,
the growth of biofuels only a¤ects the mix of renery capacity. According to Robert Pore,11
the price of gasoline isnt rising as quickly as the price of diesel, partly because expansion
of ethanol is adding e¤ective rening capacity. Thus, the growth of ethanol is squeezing the
prot margin of reneries.
We consider a renery production unit employing inputs (e.g., crude oil) to produce a mix
of outputs (e.g., gasoline, distillate fuels, and jet fuel). We assume that U.S. reneries take
output prices and input prices as given and attempt to adjust the optimal mix of outputs to
maximize prots. The prot-maximizing gasoline supply is a function of the relative price
of gasoline to distillate fuels and the relative price of gasoline to crude oil. As the focus of
this model is the gasoline market, we assume that the domestic gasoline supply is a function
of the relative price of gasoline to crude oil for simplicity. We assume that the short-run
price elasticity of the gasoline supply is 0.4. The gasoline supply curve is calibrated to the
April supply and price data of EIAs short-term energy and summer fuel outlook in the
2007/08 marketing year. The domestic gasoline supply is 120 billion gallons for the 2007/08
marketing year. In this outlook, the average wholesale gasoline price is $2.62 per gallon and
the average crude oil price is $96.83 per barrel for the 2007/08 marketing year. Thus, the
gasoline supply curve (in billion gallons) for the 2008/09 year is
QDSg;t = 72 + 1774  ( ePg;t= ePcrude;t) (28)
The price of crude oil is exogenous and follows a lognormal distribution. The mean price
of crude oil is $130 per barrel, which is the average of the futures price of crude oil from
11Robert Pore, "Ethanol saving drivers $5M per month," http://www.theindependent.com/.
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September 2008 to August 2009 on the NYMEX on May 21, 2008. The volatility of the
crude oil price is 32%, which is the implied volatility of the August 2009 crude oil futures
option on the NYMEX on May 21, 2008. Thus, the standard deviation is 41.6%.
3.6.2 Gasoline import supply
We assume the gasoline import supply to be 15.9 billion gallons for the 2008/09 marketing
year based on the EIAs short-term energy and summer fuel outlook, which means, that
QISg;t = 15:1:
12Thus, the total gasoline supply QSg;t is
QSg;t = Q
DS
g;t +Q
IS
g;t (29)
3.7 Equilibrium in the Corn, Ethanol, and Fuel Markets
For each realization of yield, acreage, non-harvested acreage, export, ethanol production
capacity, and gas price, we will have one realization of the equilibrium corn price at which
the corn market clears:
QSc;t +Q
D;storage
c;t 1 = Q
D;feed
c;t +Q
D;food
c;t +Q
D;storage
c;t +Q
D;export
c;t +Q
D;ethanol
c;t (30)
where QD;storagec;t 1 is the beginning stock of corn at time t, which is the demand of corn from
storage at time t  1:
12The U.S. has been a good market for Europes excess gasoline. Europes concerns over greenhouse
gas emissions have resulted in policies to reduce energy consumption by shifting less e¢ cient gasoline-fueled
vehicles to more e¢ cient diesel-fueled vehicles. This has resulted in diesel fuel demand increasing and gasoline
demand falling. The diesel and gasoline demand trends have resulted in Europe needing increasing distillate
imports and generating increasing volumes of gasoline for export. European gasoline exports have increased
by 505,000 barrels per day from 1999 to 2006, and U.S. imports have increased 520,000 barrels per day over
the same period. Europes interest in biofuels to help reduce greenhouse gas emissions has focused on biodiesel
and ethanol. Ethanol use in Europes gasoline will add to its export volumes. U.S. reners will potentially
see increased export volumes of gasoline available from Europe both because of Europes continued gasoline
demand decline and potentially because of increased ethanol use in Europe. We use monthly data from
Jan. 2004 to Feb. 2008 from EIA and run a regression of net imports (which includes both nished motor
gasoline imports and blending components net imports from all countries) on the price spread between the
New York Harbor Conventional Gasoline regular spot price and the Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp (ARA)
10ppm Conventional Gasoline regular spot price, a time trend, a summer dummy, and a hurricane dummy.
However, we nd the price spread is not statistically signicant after controlling for the other variables.
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Also, we will have one realization of the equilibrium ethanol price at which the ethanol
market clears:
QDe;t = Q
DS
e;t +Q
IS
e;t (31)
where we dont consider the ethanol export and stock, as the levels are very low compared
to the total demand. With the mandate in place, QDe;t  10 billion gallons. If the mandate
binds, then we solve for the price of ethanol that induces enough plants to produce 10 billion
gallons. The di¤erence between the market price of ethanol when the mandate binds and
when the mandate does not bind (at the same draws of all random variables) is the value of
the renewable identication number (RIN) for that draw.
The clearing condition for the gasoline market is
QDf;t   0:6781 QDEthanol;t = QSg;t (32)
4 Results
We simulate the short-term corn, ethanol, and gasoline market equilibriums for the 2008/09
marketing year under di¤erent policy scenarios. Table 2 presents the price, demand, and
supply results for all the scenarios. We also estimate the associated consumer and producer
surplus change, for all parties involved, from a policy change. The change in consumer
surplus for domestic feeders, corn importers, food users, ethanol blenders,13 and fuel users14
can be easily estimated by using the demand curves. The change in producer surplus for
the gasoline producers and ethanol exporters can be estimated by using their supply curves.
The change in producer surplus for corn growers is equal to the change in average revenue, as
producer surplus can be measured by prots, and costs of producing corn are constant across
13The consumer surplus of ethanol blenders (the area under the blendersethanol demand curve) measures
the net benet of blending ethanol to meet performance requirements and clean air standards.
14The consumer surplus of using ethanol as a substitute for fuel is captured by the fuel demand curve.
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the scenarios given in our model. The change in producer surplus for ethanol producers can
be measured by the change in the quasi-rent to ethanol producers because we do not model
2008/09 production capacity as a function of the price of ethanol.15 Table 3 presents the
welfare impacts in a change of federal biofuel policies. Please note that our welfare estimates
do not assign a value to any externalities associated with ethanol production, such as a
change in greenhouse gas emissions or fuel supply security.
We establish a baseline against which we can compare di¤erent scenarios with a change
of current biofuel policies. The baseline includes current ethanol mandates, $0.47-per-gallon
tax credits, and import tari¤s. The new RFS in EISA requires 9 billion gallons of corn-based
ethanol in 2008 and 10.5 billion gallons in 2009. With two-thirds of the 2008/09 marketing
year in 2009, this translates into a requirement of 10 billion gallons for the marketing year.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is responsible for promulgating regulations to
ensure that gasoline sold in the U.S. contains a minimum volume of renewable fuel. The
EPA announced that 9 billion gallons of renewable fuels are going to be required to meet the
7.76% RFS on February 14, 2008. This requirement applies to reners, importers, and certain
blenders of gasoline. Each obligated party determines the volume of renewable fuel that it
must use based on the standard.16 The EPA developed a credit trading program to enable
universal compliance. To determine RINs, the EPA determined "equivalence values" based
on the fuelsenergy content in comparison to the energy content of ethanol and adjusted
as necessary for their renewable content. A RIN is a gallon of corn-based ethanol. The
system requires that a RIN be issued with each shipment of biofuel. Blenders can use the
RIN for their own compliance as well as trade or sell excess RINs to others through the
RIN Exchange.17 The market price of RIN is the di¤erence between the demand and supply
prices of ethanol. The price of RIN is positive only when the mandate is binding.
15The quasi-rent to ethanol producers=(Pe;t   0:54) QDSe;t  QDc;t  [Pc;t   172000  (52:5 + 16:404  Pc;t)]:
16The standard is calculated as a percentage, by dividing the amount of renewable fuel that the act requires
to be blended into gasoline for a given year by the amount of gasoline expected to be used during that year.
The Clean Air Act, as amended by the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA), requires the
EPA to annually determine an RFS.
17http://www.rinxchange.com/
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In the baseline we assume that the distribution of stochastic variables in our model is
obtained given information available at the end of May 2008. Crude oil price levels and price
variability are taken from the New York Mercantile Exchange "light sweet crude oil" futures
and options markets. We calibrate the structural model for corn and fuel markets to the
May WASDE and the April EIA shortterm energy and summer fuel outlook.
For the 2008/09 marketing year,our baseline corn price distribution has a mean (the
expected price) of $5.86 per bushel and a volatility of 31.26%. The average ethanol, gasoline
(CBOB), and blended fuel prices would be $2.69, $3.11, and $3.08 per gallon, respectively.
On average, 92% of ethanol domestic production capacity would be operating. The average
domestic ethanol production, ethanol import supply, and ethanol blended would be 10.62
billion, 506 million, and 11 billion gallons, respectively. The expected total gasoline supply
(both domestic and import) and the expected total fuel demand (adjusted by energy content)
would be 131.6 billion and 139.1 billion gallons, respectively. The probability that the
mandate is binding would be 28%. The RIN price distribution has a mean of 9.6 cents per
gallon with a standard deviation of 21 cents per gallon.
4.1 Mandate Elimination
A relaxation of mandates would have little impact on the ethanol industrys capacity unless
some plants currently under construction are mothballed. The 2008 crop-year impacts of
eliminating the mandate are modest. Because both the blenders tax credit and the mandate
increase the demand for ethanol, elimination of only one of these policies would have little
impact because the other one would e¤ectively keep the industry operating at close to current
capacity. We estimate that such a policy change would decrease the expected corn price by
3.9%, to $5.63 per bushel. The corn price volatility would decrease to 29.3% because corn
prices are not bid up as strongly without a mandate in short-crop years. Elimination of the
mandate would reduce expected ethanol production by about 3%; the ethanol price would
drop by less than 3%; imports would fall by 34.8%; the gasoline supply would decrease by
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0.2%; total ethanol use would drop by 4.4%; and the fuel price would increase by 0.3%. On
average, 90% of ethanol domestic production capacity would be operating.
On average, elimination of the EISA mandate would reduce the welfare of corn growers,
ethanol producers, ethanol exporters to the U.S., and fuel users while increasing the welfare
of domestic feeders, food users, corn importers from the U.S., ethanol blenders, gasoline
producers, and taxpayers. Corn growers would be the biggest loser, with an estimated
expected producer surplus loss of $2.37 billion. Domestic fuel users would lose an expected
consumer surplus of $1.45 billion. On average, the producer surplus loss of ethanol producers
and ethanol exporters would be $54 million and $84 million, respectively. Gasoline producers
would be the biggest winner, with an estimated expected producer surplus gain of $1.88
billion, and domestic livestock feeders would be the second-largest winners, with an estimated
expected producer surplus of $1.12 billion. On average, ethanol blenders, corn importers from
the U.S., and domestic food users would gain $940 million, $435 million and $303 million
in consumer surplus, respectively. U.S. government revenue would increase by $126 million.
We see welfare transfers from corn growers to corn users and from fuel users to gasoline
producers. The expected net welfare gains from eliminating the EISA mandate would be
$846 million.
4.2 Tax Credit Elimination
Removing only the blenders credit but leaving the mandate in place would have modest
market impacts because the mandate would keep ethanol production high. Taxpayers would
benet because of an increase in tax revenue. But fuel users would have to pay a higher
price for ethanol. Corn prices would drop by an average of 3.5% from the baseline level.
Expected ethanol production would drop by about 2.8%; the ethanol price would drop by
10.2%; imports would fall by 40.5%; the gasoline supply would increase by 0.2%; the fuel
price would increase by 0.1%; and total fuel demand would remain largely unchanged. On
average, 90% of ethanol domestic production capacity would be operating. The probability
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that the mandate is binding would be 49.3%.
On average, removal of the tax credit would reduce the welfare of corn growers, ethanol
blenders, ethanol producers, ethanol exporters, and fuel users. It would increase government
revenue and the welfare of domestic feeders, food users, corn importers, and gasoline pro-
ducers. Such a policy change would increase expected government revenue by an average of
$5.1 billion. Gasoline producers would gain $2.75 billion because of less competition from
ethanol production. Domestic feeders, food users, and corn importers from the U.S. would
gain about $1.06 billion, $275 million, and $410 million, respectively. Corn growers and
ethanol producers would be the top two losers, each with estimated expected losses of $2.4
billion. On average, ethanol blenders would lose $909 million and ethanol exporters would
lose only $16 million, as the mandate keeps the ethanol price high. The expected net welfare
gain from removing the tax credit would be $3.46 billion.
4.3 Tari¤ Elimination
Removing the import tari¤ while keeping in place the mandate and tax credit creates a
large incentive to import ethanol. In this scenario, ethanol imports would more than triple.
This surge in imports would reduce domestic ethanol production by an average of 1.9%,
which would reduce the price of corn by an average of 2.5%. Ethanol prices would drop by
2.5% and fuel prices would drop by 1.2%. On average, 90% of ethanol domestic production
capacity would be operating. The probability that the mandate is binding would be 18.7%.
Removal of the tari¤ would reduce government revenue, and the welfare of corn growers,
and ethanol and gasoline producers, while it would increase the welfare of domestic feeders,
food users, corn importers, ethanol blenders, ethanol exporters, and fuel users. Fuel users
would benet most, with an average gain of $5.08 billion in consumer surplus. On average,
domestic feeders, food users, corn importers, and ethanol blenders would gain $730 million,
$197 million, $276 million and $453 million in consumer surplus, respectively. Gasoline
producers, corn growers and U.S. ethanol producers would lose $3.53 billion, $1.58 billion,
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and $229 million, respectively. Expected government revenue would decrease by $1.39 billion.
The net expected welfare gain on average would be $568 million, which is close to the
producer surplus increase of ethanol exporters.
4.4 Tax Credit and Tari¤ Elimination
Removal of the tax credit and the tari¤ would result in a substantial but smaller surge in
imports, as increased imports would reduce the amount of domestic ethanol that would be
needed to meet the mandate. Compared to the baseline results, domestic ethanol production
would fall by about 6.1%, imports would increase by 88%, the price of corn would drop by
7.7%, the price of ethanol would drop by 13.7%, and the price of fuel would drop by 0.5%.
The probability that the mandate is binding would be 42.3%. The market price impacts of
this policy change are not any larger because the RFS keeps total ethanol demand high and
the supply of imported ethanol is not unlimited.
Removal of both the tax credit and the tari¤ would reduce producer surplus of corn
growers by $5.16 billion and the producer surplus of ethanol producers by $2.58 billion. The
expected consumer surplus of ethanol blenders would decrease by $44 million. Domestic
feeders, fuel users, corn importers, and food users would gain by $2.3 billion, $2 billion,
$891 million, and $608 million in expected consumer surplus, respectively. The expected
government revenue would increase by $4.9 billion. The expected net welfare gain from such
a policy change would be $4.88 billion.
4.5 Mandate and Tari¤ Elimination
Elimination of both the mandate and the tari¤ would reduce the expected corn price by
4.9% from the baseline level, expected ethanol production would drop by about 3.8%, the
expected ethanol price would drop by 4.2%, ethanol imports would increase by 197.8%, the
gasoline supply would fall by 0.2%, the fuel price would fall by 1%, and the total fuel demand
would increase by 0.1%. On average, 89% of ethanol domestic production capacity would be
25
operating.
Removal of both the mandate and the tari¤ would reduce the producer surplus of corn
growers by about $3 billion, the ethanol producer surplus by $251 million, and the gasoline
producer surplus by about $2.4 billion. Government revenue would drop by about $1.2
billion. Fuel users, domestic feeders, ethanol blenders, corn importers, and food users would
gain $4.2 billion, $1.4 billion, $1 billion, $551 million, and $382 million in consumer surplus,
respectively. Ethanol exporters would gain $454 million in producer surplus. The average
net welfare gain from removing both the mandate and the tari¤ would be $1.2 billion.
4.6 Mandate and Tax Credit Elimination
Removal of both the mandate and the tax credit would have a much larger impact on corn
prices because the ethanol industrys ability to pay for corn would decrease substantially.
However, the extent to which ethanol prices would fall depends on gasoline prices and on
the willingness of blenders to pay for reduced volumes of ethanol. Under this scenario,
we estimate that ethanol production would decrease by about 10.3% from baseline levels;
the expected ethanol price would decrease by 17.3%; the expected corn price would drop
by 13%; and the expected fuel price would increase by 0.9%. The impacts of eliminating
the mandate and the tax credit are not as great as one might expect because the ethanol
industry would continue to operate until processing margins turn negative. We estimate that
the drop in ethanol supply would increase blended fuel prices by about two cents per gallon
because increased gasoline prices would more than o¤set the reduction in ethanol prices.
The corn price impacts would be greater if the tari¤ on imported Brazilian ethanol were also
eliminated.
The biggest winner from removal of the mandate and the tax credit would be gasoline
producers, who would gain $6.9 billion on average. Government revenue would increase by
an average of $5 billion. Domestic feeders, corn importers, food users, and ethanol blenders
would gain $3.9 billion, $1.52 billion, $1 billion, and $1.46 billion in expected consumer
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surplus, respectively. Fuel users would lose $3.75 billion in expected consumer surplus. Corn
growers, U.S. ethanol producers, and ethanol exporters would lose $8.4 billion, $2.58 billion,
and $112 million in producer surplus, respectively. The average net welfare gain would be
about $5 billion.
4.7 All Programs Eliminated
A rollback of all ethanol incentives and protections would have the largest impacts. The
expected price of corn would drop by almost 14.5% from the baseline level, to about $5.00
per bushel. The loss of demand subsidies would cause the price of ethanol to drop by 18.6%.
The expected fuel price would increase by 0.2%; domestic ethanol production would drop
by 11.5%; ethanol imports would increase by 28.1%; total gasoline supply would increase
by 0.5%; and total fuel demand would remain almost unchanged from baseline levels. On
average, 82% of ethanol plants would be operating in this scenario.
The average net welfare gain from removing all ethanol policies would be $5.8 billion.
The expected producer surplus of the biggest winner, gasoline suppliers, would increase by
$5.05 billion. Average government revenue would increase by $4.9 billion. Domestic feeders,
corn importers, and food users would gain $4.37 billion, $1.72 billion, and $1.14 billion in
expected consumer surplus, respectively. The average producer surplus of ethanol exporters
would remain almost unchanged. Corn growers and ethanol producers would lose $9.4 billion
and $2.65 billion in average producer surplus, respectively. Fuel users would lose $975 million
in average consumer surplus.
5 Conclusions
We use a short-run, stochastic equilibrium model to explore the price and welfare impacts
of U.S. ethanol policy for the 2008/09 corn marketing year. Policy changes are estimated
relative to a baseline policy that includes EISA ethanol mandates, the current blenders tax
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credit, and current import tari¤s. Impacts on the average market prices of corn, ethanol, and
gasoline from partial and complete removal of these three policy instruments are estimated,
and changes in average producer surplus, consumer surplus, and government revenue are
estimated.
Our results show that in the short-run, a change in U.S. policy would not have a large,
immediate impact on corn prices, because ethanol plants will keep operating as long as their
revenue covers their operating cost. Elimination of any one of the three policies would reduce
the average corn price by less than 4%. Removal of any two of the three policies would have
a larger but still modest impact on corn prices. For example, the average corn price would
drop by 13% if both the mandate and tax credit were removed. A rollback of all ethanol
incentives and protections would decrease the expected corn price by 14.5%.
A change in ethanol policies would also a¤ect the price that consumers pay for trans-
portation fuel. Elimination of both the mandate and tax credit would increase the expected
blended fuel price by 0.9%. This would reduce fuel usersconsumer surplus by $3.7 billion.
Fuel users surplus would increase by more than $5 billion if all tari¤s were removed on
imported ethanol. Increased competition from imported ethanol would cause both gasoline
and ethanol prices to decrease, resulting in a $3.5 billion loss to gasoline producers and a
$2.6 billion loss in surplus to domestic ethanol producers. Tari¤ removal would result in
a net global welfare gain, the size of which is about equal to the gain obtained by ethanol
exporters.
Because both the blenders tax credit and the mandate increase the demand for ethanol,
elimination of one of these would not have a large impact on domestic ethanol production.
Removing both would reduce the expected domestic ethanol production by 10.3%, and re-
moving all would decrease the production by 11.5%. Eliminating the import tari¤ while
keeping the mandate and tax credit would increase average ethanol imports by about 220%.
The model presented here is currently being expanded to include the soybean complex and
projections for more than one year. The resulting model will be used as a combination market
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outlook and policy analysis tool that can easily accommodate updated market information
and crop conditions as they become available from NASS and WASDE. Price distributions
that reect the latest policies and market information will provide objective and transparent
information about the impact of commodity and biofuels policies and crop developments on
fuel, feed, and food prices.
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Figure 1: The distribution of corn yield (bushels per acre) for 2008
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Figure 2: The distribution of ethanol production capacity (billion gallons) in the 2008/09
marketing year
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Figure 3: The distribution of ethanol production e¢ ciency index (gallons per bushel)
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